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Abstract 
 
We investigate whether institutional ownership (IO) plays a role in transmitting systemic risk through 
banks. We find robust evidence suggesting that IO is positively associated with future systemic risk. 
We find this relationship is stronger during economic downturns at the economy-wide level, as well as 
for banks demonstrating greater capital needs.  Our results also suggest a trading mechanism through 
which active, and transient institutions in particular, play a role in propagating systemic risk.  We find 
the relationship exists when there is both overlapping and non-overlapping ownership of banks, and 
the result is concentrated when there are low monitoring incentives for institutional owners.  
Furthermore, we find disclosure may play a role in mitigating the transmission of systemic risk by 
institutional investors. Overall, our results should be of interest to regulators, who have called for 
institutional investors to play a larger role in bank monitoring, and more broadly to the academic 
literature that tends to assume the benefits of IO without adequate consideration of the potential costs.    
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines whether institutional ownership (“IO”) acts as a transmission 
mechanism for systemic risk in the banking sector. Following the financial crisis there was a 
concerted effort among regulators, academics and practitioners to understand the factors that 
contributed to the systemic failure of the financial system. An important dimension of systemic 
risk that was identified is the correlated movements in market prices among banks—i.e., tail-risk 
contagion—which increased banks’ cost of capital and contributed to a liquidity crunch. Initial 
regulation called for higher capital adequacy requirements, formalized liquidity standards, and 
periodic stress testing of financial institutions. However, recent reforms have focused on the role 
of market participants in disciplining and monitoring banks (BIS 2015; Dodd-Frank 2010). This 
regulatory approach is predicated on the notion that greater disclosures allow sophisticated market 
participants access to important information relating to a bank’s regulatory capital and risk 
exposures, enabling more effective market discipline. Institutional investors are a key group of 
market participants that have sufficient sophistication, ability and incentive to engage in 
monitoring (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny 1986, 1997).    
While prior literature has shown that IO may generally serve as an important governance 
mechanism to mitigate excessive risk taking, the role IO may play with respect to systemic risk in 
the banking sector is less clear and is the focus of this paper.  A considerable amount of academic 
and practitioner research has been devoted to the study of systemic risk and the factors that 
influence it.1 Prior research suggests systemic risk can arise from external factors such as market 
                                                             
1 For example, prior studies have examined: delayed expected loss recognition (Bushman and Williams 2015), lending 
concentration of bank portfolios (Beck and De Jonghe 2013), loan diversification practices (Wagner 2010), fair value 
accounting (Khan, forthcoming), excessive risk taking (e.g. Korinek 2011), and systemic shocks to funding of liquidity 
providers (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009) as factors that have exacerbated systemic risk and financial fragility.    
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frictions (e.g., illiquidity) due to correlation in tail risk during market downturns or internal factors 
such as excessive risk taking and correlated credit risk exposure. In this paper, we focus on external 
factors and argue that institutional investors’ sizeable trades, coupled with their correlated funding 
and trading behavior, may actually serve as a transmission mechanism through which the 
correlation in tail risk can increase. In turn, this increased tail risk comovement during market 
downturns can make raising capital more difficult precisely when banks need capital the most, 
thus, exacerbating systemic risk. Accordingly, we are not advocating that IO creates systemic risk 
per se, but rather, that it may act as a transmission mechanism through which systemic risk 
propagates among banks in the financial system.   
Our intuition is based on a set of studies that suggests that institutional ownership is 
associated with excess equity return comovement and a destabilization of prices (e.g. Pindyck and 
Rotemberg 1993; Boyson, Stahel and Stulz 2010; Della Croce et al. 2011). In our context, IO may 
exacerbate tail risk co-movement among banks for the following interrelated reasons: First, 
institutional investors typically hold larger portfolios of stocks than individuals or insiders. The 
ownership of a portfolio of stocks inherently creates a potential connection between the stocks in 
the portfolio through the institutional holder (e.g. Anton and Polk 2014). If there is adverse price 
movement in one of the stocks within the portfolio, the adverse movement has the potential to 
propagate to the other holdings as the institutional owner responds through rebalancing, i.e. 
overlapping ownership mechanism (e.g. Kodres and Pritsker 2002).2 Second, in down markets, we 
tend to see more correlated trading among institutions given the adverse funding liquidity shock 
                                                             
2 Whether this rebalancing has an adverse or favorable impact on other stocks in the portfolio is a matter of how the 
institution specifically rebalances and the potential for increased redemptions. If the adverse price movement results 
in their offloading of an underperforming sector, it could spread this adverse price movement to other holdings in 
that sector. If the adverse price movement results in the purchase of more shares in that sector to regain the original 
percentage holdings in that sector, it could have positive price effects.   
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to a common pool of capital. For example, Boyson et al. (2010) find evidence suggesting that 
hedge funds exhibit correlated trading based on correlated factors and adverse liquidity shocks; 
along the same lines Shleifer and Vishny’s (1992) asset fire sale model. Relatedly, correlated 
returns may occur among a group of stocks due to clientele effects and/or style investing.3 Clientele 
theories assume that each stock has a body of investors who find it attractive, which may lead to 
only limited market participation in each group of stocks (Sun 2015). Consequently, when a 
liquidity shock affects a marginal investor, it likely triggers a liquidity shock for the group of 
stocks in the marginal investor’s portfolio. This mechanism simultaneously increases the trading 
volume and decreases the liquidity of this group of stocks, resulting in excess comovement (see 
Sun 2015; Greenwood and Thesmar 2011). Finally, program trading and stop-loss mechanisms at 
asset managers may also contribute to tail risk comovement.4 In sum, the degree of IO within 
banking stocks may be a catalyst for tail-risk comovement and thus propagate systemic risk.   
However, we acknowledge arguments to the contrary, i.e., IO may reduce systemic risk.   
For example, Ye (2012) provides empirical evidence that having more active IO within bank stocks 
may mitigate excess comovement in stocks, and by extension, should decrease the propagation of 
systemic risk.  Ultimately, this an open empirical question.5  
                                                             
3 The style investing refers to the tendency of investors to group assets in categories and then allocate funds on the 
level of these categories treating all securities within a particular group as indistinguishable.  This type of trading 
behavior could be a result of limited investor attention, specific portfolio objectives, trading restrictions, or regulations.   
4 By “program trading”, we refer to the rise in the use of algorithmic trading by IO to buy and sell securities based on 
predetermined instructions and price movements. This can propagate systemic risk because the trades of these 
institutional investors will become more correlated precisely when it may have the biggest impact. For example, the 
influence of these types of mechanisms was evident in the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010. The U.S. equity markets lost 
close to $1 trillion dollars in the space of 36 minutes. The catalyst for the crash was a $4.1 billion sell order initiated 
by a large mutual fund at around 2:32pm, which immediately exhausted the pool of available buyers, sparking further 
selling by other traders, including HFT algorithms that detected the sell-off and started dumping their positions. The 
sudden drop in prices also triggered algorithmic stop-losses at several large asset managers, which further depressed 
prices. The official report by the SEC and CFTC actually referred to this as a “hot potato” effect, highlighting the role 
of correlated trading. 
5 There is also a body of research that examines the governance role of IO. This may lead to the opposite prediction 
that higher IO may reduce systemic risk among banks. The intuition is as follows: Institutional investors have 
incentives to collect information and monitor management because of the sizeable stakes they hold in the firm (e.g. 
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To test the relationship between IO and systemic risk we take the following empirical 
approach.  We focus on the important dimension of systemic risk that is tail risk co-movement, 
and examine the co-dependence of equity returns in the left tail of the distribution between a bank 
and the banking system (e.g. Acharya et al. 2017; Bushman et al. 2016). We take two specific 
approaches to this measure. Our first proxy is the marginal expected shortfall, which captures the 
correlation between a bank’s equity returns and market equity returns on days where the market 
return is in the bottom five percent for the year, where the market is defined as the banking sector. 
Our second proxy for systemic risk captures the extent of this left tail co-dependence by once again 
computing the distribution of realized returns for each bank and counting the number of 
overlapping days between individual bank poor performance and poor performance of the banking 
sector.   
Using our two proxies for tail risk co-movement, we regress both measures of tail risk 
comovement on lagged IO, a set of control variables, and bank and year fixed effects. Consistent 
with IO behaving as a transmission mechanism, we find that higher levels of prior year institutional 
ownership are positively associated with banks’ tail risk comovement. In addition to there being a 
statistically significant relationship, our results also suggest the relationship is economically 
significant. A one standard-deviation increase in institutional ownership is associated with an 
increase in our tail risk comovement proxies of between 13 and 19 percent relative to sample 
means. These results are robust to controlling for several other factors related to bank comovement. 
                                                             
Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Gillan and Starks 2003). Higher quality financial reporting can facilitate more effective 
monitoring by institutions. For example, theoretical and empirical research suggests that institutional investors are 
attracted to firms with better disclosures due to lower monitoring costs (e.g. Bushee and Noe 2000; Lambert et al. 
2007; Ferreira and Matos 2008). Such monitoring by IO can lead to more efficient managerial decisions and outcomes. 
Accordingly, one may expect IO to be negatively associated with tail-risk co-movement. However, the focus of our 
paper is on IO exacerbating systemic risk vis-à-vis their trading behavior, to the extent that the monitoring role 
dominates then we should find opposite results to our predicted positive relation.   
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In addition, consistent with IO experiencing common adverse funding liquidity shocks during 
market downturns, when we partition the sample into periods that capture economic downturns 
versus expansions we find the positive relation between IO and systemic risk is significantly 
exacerbated during downturns. Furthermore, we provide strong cross-sectional evidence that IO 
exacerbates systemic risk within banks with heightened capital needs, consistent with the notion 
that IO increases tail-risk precisely when banks are most vulnerable.   
To provide further evidence that our main results are at least partially attributable to the 
trading activities of institutional investors, we next examine the relation between tail risk 
comovement and the ownership of bank stocks by institutions characterized by high turnover.  
Active managers tend to have more volatile capital flows that could trigger immediate buying 
and/or selling of portfolio securities. Moreover, large active traders are likely to also engage in 
algorithmic/program trading which may exacerbate tail risk. In contrast however, Ye (2012) 
provides novel evidence that suggests that more active IO may actually reduce excess comovement 
observed in stocks, and find that after active IO exit a stock this results in greater price 
synchronicity. Extrapolating to our setting, we attempt to answer this open empirical question, and 
examine whether institutional investors with higher share turnover are more likely to act as a 
propagator of systemic risk due to the greater number of trades they execute 
 We employ two measures of “active” IO.  First, we isolate high turnover investors based 
on the turnover of their portfolios during the previous 12-month period using 13F and FactSet 
portfolio data. Second, we employ the investor classifications of Bushee (2001) who classifies IO 
as transient, quasi-indexer and dedicated based on size of holdings and portfolio turnover. Using 
both of these proxies for active trading we find that stock ownership from these “active” investors 
has a much stronger relation with our tail risk comovement measures. Specifically, the positive 
6 
 
association between IO and our systemic risk proxies is approximately two to five times stronger 
for MES and two to four times stronger for the number of overlapping days. Conversely, we find 
that “dedicated” institutional investors play no role in the transmission of tail risk comovement, 
but in fact may mitigate the spread of adverse shocks. Overall, this evidence is consistent with 
arguments that institutional investors’ trades can propagate tail risk comovement, with more active 
institutional owners facilitating greater tail risk comovement, while those with longer-term 
investment horizons and thus greater incentives to monitor (i.e. “dedicated” investors) may have a 
stabilizing effect on systemic risk; in-line with the regulatory shift towards market discipline.   
Following prior research that suggests stocks with common overlap in IO exhibit excess 
comovement (e.g. Anton and Polk 2014), we further test the trading mechanism through which IO 
may propagate systemic risk by directly examining common ownership among banks.  
Specifically, to test whether overlap in IO contributes to tail risk comovement, we re-define our 
“bank sector” measure used to compute tail dependence. We match each bank-year observation to 
other banks that share a common institutional owner and banks that do not share a common 
institutional owner. We then repeat our main analysis across the two sets of matched bank 
samples—i.e., those with common overlap and those without—to test whether the overlap in 
institutional ownership specifically contributes to tail risk comovement. Consistent with the 
overlapping investor mechanism, we find that banks with shared ownership are four to five times 
as likely to propagate systemic risk relative to banks that do not share any overlapping institutional 
investors. However, increased IO still adversely relates to tail risk comovement among banks 
without any common overlap in IO, consistent with investor clientele and style investing theories, 
and algorithmic-trading programs of large asset managers. These results also support the idea that 
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an overlapping active investor base is not the only mechanism through which IO can influence tail 
risk co-movement.  
As prior literature suggests IO may play a governance role by monitoring firm activities to 
increase firm value, we next partition our results based on the concentration of institutional owners 
as a proxy for the strength of monitoring incentives. Specifically, if institutions that trade more 
propagate tail-risk comovement, we would expect institutions with less monitoring incentives to 
drive this result versus the institutions that monitor and are more likely to trade based on 
fundamentals. We compute the concentration of IO holdings for banks in our sample using the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index and partition our sample into dispersed and concentrated IO, 
representing low and high monitoring incentives, respectively. We find that the positive 
association between IO and tail risk comovement documented is driven by the more dispersed IO 
subsample (i.e. low monitoring incentives), while in the more concentrated IO subsample (i.e. high 
monitoring incentives), IO has no detectable relation with systemic risk. These results are 
consistent with the notion that once many institutional owners purchase a stock, dispersed 
ownership reduces the individual incentive to monitor and leads to free-rider problems (i.e. each 
investor relies on others to undertake costly monitoring activities). Moreover, given the large 
number of stocks institutional investors tend to hold and their relatively short-term orientation, 
there is less incentive for them to monitor individual firms, since they will simply “exit” their 
positions at the first sign of poor performance (e.g. Manconi et al. 2012).  
After exploring whether IO is positively associated with tail risk comovement, we turn to 
whether disclosure can mitigate the adverse effects of institutional trading by decreasing 
information asymmetry and increasing stock liquidity. Basel III is based on the principle that 
increased disclosure allows market participants to better monitor the risks a bank undertakes (BIS 
8 
 
2015). To this end, a growing literature in accounting suggests that higher quality disclosures can 
mitigate systemic concerns (Bushman and Williams 2015). Moreover, as institutions experience 
adverse shocks in their portfolios, greater disclosure may reduce the uncertainty surrounding the 
fundamentals of the bank, reducing the propagation of the adverse shock for banks who are more 
transparent (e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). Accordingly, we posit that greater bank 
disclosures will help reduce uncertainty regarding the bank’s underlying economic activities and 
may decrease both the correlation across institutional investors’ trades as well as the correlation of 
trades within an institution’s portfolio. Consistent with these arguments we find that the relation 
between IO and systemic risk is primarily isolated within those banks with low disclosure. This 
provides initial evidence that greater disclosures may mitigate, but not completely offset, the 
relationship between IO and tail risk comovement. 
A concern that may arise in examining the relation between IO and tail risk co-movement 
is that institutional owners may have a preference for certain types of banks, particularly banks 
that have a high contribution to systemic risk. While it is not clear to us ex ante why IO would 
have a preference for high tail risk co-movement stocks, we still try to empirically address this 
endogeneity concern using an instrumental variables approach to provide further support for our 
initial results.  Specifically, we use the Russell 1000 index classifications as our instrument. We 
examine banks within the lower bound of the Russell 1000 index and the upper bound of the 
Russell 2000 index, we attempt to isolate the exogenous variation in IO.  Upon re-estimating our 
analyses, we find consistent results with our main findings: higher IO is significantly associated 
with greater future systemic risk.     
Overall, our results suggest that IO could be a transmission mechanism of systemic risk 
through tail risk comovement, highlighting the importance of the nuanced benefits and potential 
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costs of current regulatory discussions suggesting that greater disclosure will encourage better 
monitoring from sophisticated investors.  That is, the same investors that will be attracted by 
greater disclosures and can monitor well, may also exacerbate tail risk comovement due to the 
nature of their trading.    
This paper primarily contributes to the literature on systemic risk. While prior research has 
explored various determinants of a bank’s susceptibility to systemic risk, to our knowledge, our 
paper is the first to investigate whether a bank’s investor base is one of the mechanisms that 
facilitates systemic risk. Understanding the role of IO in transmitting systemic risk through tail 
risk comovement is important, as regulators have called for increased disclosure quality to increase 
public monitoring of banks in hopes to reduce systemic risk. While institutional investors are 
arguably well equipped to monitor bank behavior, the nature of the institutional holdings creates a 
network to transmit systemic shocks from one bank to the other. Our results provide a mechanism, 
the trading behavior of institutional ownership, through which financial markets themselves can 
trigger and transmit systemic risk. Moreover, we also highlight that the type of IO has differential 
impacts on the propagation of systemic risk among banks.6  
Relatedly, our results should also be of interest to regulators given the potential for IO to be a 
transmission mechanism for tail-risk comovement. This is especially true given the focus of the 
recent Basel III on market discipline, and the recent call from the Financial Stability Oversight 
                                                             
6 A concurrent working paper by Iselin et al. (2017) also examines the impact of institutional ownership on systemic 
risk; however, Iselin et al (2017) focus exclusively on the contribution of overlapping block ownership—i.e. greater 
than 5% ownership of equity. Their study differs from ours on several important dimensions. First, we examine 
institutional ownership more broadly, i.e. total institutional ownership within banking stocks as opposed to only 
overlapping ownership by block holders. Second, we examine whether characteristics of IO play different roles in 
contributing or mitigating systemic risk. Third, we also examine the role of disclosure in mitigating or attenuating the 
relation between IO and systemic risk. Finally, the choice of systemic risk proxies and research design choices differ 
somewhat between the two papers.  
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Council (FSOC) for research to understand the channels through which the asset management 
industry could transmit risks across financial markets, and whether to consider large institutional 
investors for enhanced prudential standards and supervision under Dodd-Frank. Our findings 
suggest that more active and transient IO propagate systemic risk. Therefore, while IO may be able 
to act as a governance mechanism and promote private monitoring this needs to be weighed against 
the possibility that institutional ownership acts as a transmission mechanism for industry shocks. 
Finally, we also contribute to the literatures on disclosure and the role of institutional investors 
by investigating a potential cost of increased institutional ownership. Institutional funds are 
important in the economy as they help investors diversify their assets and provide financing to 
firms. Papers on disclosure and investor relations usually assume, either explicitly or implicitly, 
that increased institutional ownership is a desirable outcome for firms (e.g., Bushee and Miller 
2012; Kirk and Vincent 2014). Our results suggest that institutional ownership can be costly for 
firms in the financial sector by transmitting systemic risk. This evidence resonates with the IMF’s 
concerns about investment funds posing financial stability risks (International Monetary Fund 
2015).   
 
2 Data, Variable Measurement, and Descriptive Statistics 
2.1 Data 
We obtain data from several sources: institutional holdings data is obtained from 
FactSet/LionShares, financial data from the Compustat Bank Fundamentals file, and market data 
(e.g. returns, prices, market capitalization and volume) from CRSP. Our final sample is the 
intersection of all three data sources, matched on CUSIP.  We begin our sampling procedures by 
taking all banks from the Compustat Bank Fundamentals file incorporated in the U.S. with a 
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December fiscal year-end and at least one-year of return data within our sample period of 2001-
2013, effectively capturing all depositary institutions trading on US stock exchanges.  Our sample 
begins in 2001 to ensure the entire sampling period is consistent with post-Glass Steagall repeal 
regime. This leaves us with a sample of 7,621 bank-years for 1,019 unique firms.  We then merge 
in institutional investor holdings data from FactSet/LionShares. In less than six percent of firm-
years where no institutional holdings can be found we assume holdings of zero.  We then compute 
our systemic risk measures using market data and control variables using both Compustat and 
CRSP.  Given we require a constant sample for our main analyses; we require all bank-year 
observations to have sufficient data.  Our final sample consists of 6,493 bank-years (937 banks) 
from 2001 to 2013.   
2.2 Measuring Systemic Risk 
Given we are interested in the relation between IO and systemic risk, the empirical 
approach to measuring systemic risk is an important consideration. At a broad level, systemic risk 
can refer to any set of circumstances that threatens the stability or public confidence in the financial 
system and impairs its functioning (e.g., Billio et al. 2011; ECB 2010). However, there is a lack of 
consensus among policymakers, regulators or academics as to how to precisely define or measure 
systemic risk (see Bisias et al. 2012 for review). Measures of systemic risk vary from country-
level outcomes (e.g., asset price boom/bust cycles, credit gap indicators, and GDP stress tests), to 
firm-level outcomes focused on codependence of market outcomes (e.g., marginal expected and 
systemic shortfall, CoVAR, and serial correlation and liquidity in hedge-fund returns).  
An important dimension of systemic risk is tail risk comovement and, as such, we appeal 
to a stream of literature that focuses on codependence in the tails of equity returns. This dimension 
is intuitively appealing given that tail risk reflects the market’s risk assessment of the bank (and 
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banking system) based on a broad set of factors and vulnerabilities (e.g. Acharya et al. 2017; 
Adrian and Brunnermeier 2009; Bushman and Williams 2015; De Jonghe 2010). The growing 
popularity of market-based measures of bank risk from regulators and academics alike is based on 
empirical evidence that market signals contain pertinent information about banks’ risks.7 By 
focusing on banks’ exposure to market crashes, this measure incorporates a systemically relevant 
consequence, given many banks get into distress at the same time when the economy contracts 
severely (e.g., Knaup and Wagner 2012). For regulators, having an estimate of how much an 
individual bank is exposed to a banking sector crash (i.e. tail risk) is important as it can help to 
identify potentially weak banks and it may help to further understand determinants of systemic 
risk (Bisias et al. 2012). Moreover, given our focus on the role of institutional ownership on the 
propagation of systemic risk, tail risk measures have a natural link to trading behavior of market 
participants. Our focus on the role of IO in the propagation of systemic risk is also in line with 
recent calls from the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) to study the activities of asset 
managers to better inform whether—and how—to consider large institutional investors for 
enhanced prudential standards and supervision under Dodd-Frank (FSOC 2012). Guided by the 
FSOC mandate, the Office of Financial Research has undertaken several studies to better 
understand the channels through which the asset management industry could transmit risks across 
financial markets (e.g., OFR 2013). For all the aforementioned reasons, we examine whether IO 
may propagate systemic risk vis-à-vis tail-risk contagion.  
We employ two proxies to measure systemic risk that are adapted from the Marginal 
Expected Shortfall measure of Acharya et al. (2017). This measure captures the connection 
between a bank’s equity returns and the banking sector (“market”) equity returns on days when 
                                                             
7 For a survey of the empirical evidence see Flannery (2001) and Bisias et al. (2012).  
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the market return is in the bottom 5% for the year.  Accordingly, our first measure, (MES), is 
defined as the average return of a bank (Ri) during the bottom 5% of return days for the overall 
banking sector (Rm-i) for a given calendar year t. The banking sector return (Rm-i) is defined as the 
daily value-weighted return of all sample banks, excluding bank i. This measure captures the extent 
to which an individual bank performs poorly when the sector as a whole is performing poorly, i.e. 
its losses in the tail of the aggregate sector’s loss distribution.  
Our second measure, Overlap_Low_Days, reflects the number of days in year t that both 
bank i and the overall banking sector simultaneously experience poor return performance. We 
define this variable as the number of days in year t that bank i’s bottom twenty days of daily stock 
returns coincide with the bottom twenty days of the value-weighted banking sector return (Rm-i).8 
This measure can vary between 0 days (no overlapping days) and 20 days (perfect overlap).    
We report descriptive statistics relating to our two systemic risk variables in Table 1. We 
note mean values of MES and Overlap_Low_Days of -0.0115 and 5.1314, respectively. As 
expected, MES is negative 1.1%, with the average bank having approximately five of their worst 
return days overlapping with poor overall sector performance. Overlap_Low_Days varies from 2 
at the 25th percentile to 8 at the 75th percentile, while MES remains negative and varies from -1.9% 
at the 25th percentile to -0.12% at the 75th percentile. Furthermore, the correlation between our two 
measures of systemic risk is -0.70, providing further evidence consist with our proxies capturing 
a similar construct.  
2.3 Measuring Institutional Ownership 
We obtain institutional holdings data from FactSet/LionShares, which contains both 13F 
holdings and global mutual fund holdings disclosures. The Securities and Exchange Commission 
                                                             
8 For both measures, we exclude firm-years that do not have a full year of returns data in CRSP.  
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(SEC) requires all institutions, including foreign investors, that have investment discretion over 
$100 million or more in Section 13(f) securities (i.e. publicly traded equity, convertible bonds, and 
some options) to disclose their quarter-end holdings in these qualifying assets on Form 13F. This 
ensures we are getting a complete picture of large institutional ownership of our sample banks. 
However, institutions that hold fewer than 10,000 shares in a given stock and have aggregate fair 
market value of holdings in that stock totaling less than $200,000 may omit these smaller holdings.  
In order to capture some of these smaller positions, we augment our 13F data with global mutual 
fund holdings data obtained from FactSet/LionShares to create a comprehensive dataset of 
institutional holdings.  We sum the holdings of all institutions in a given bank’s stock at the end 
of each calendar year and divide it by the total number of shares outstanding.  Our primary variable 
of interest, IO, is the fraction of total shares outstanding at the end of the calendar year held by 
institutional investors. As reported in Table 1 our sample banks have an average of 26% 
institutional ownership.  
We also breakdown IO into “active” and “passive” based on the extent of portfolio turnover 
within each year. Specifically, we define active institutional owners based on portfolio turnover 
classifications provided by FactSet, where those institutions classified as having “Very High” and 
“High” portfolio turnover are “active.” We merge our holdings data to our sample of banks using 
CUSIP. In addition, we also employ the investor classifications of Bushee (2001) to classify IO as 
dedicated, quasi-indexer and transient based on their holdings turnover. Where transient investors 
are “active” IO, and dedicated IO are those institutions with large long-term positions and likely 
have a greater monitoring role.         
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3 Research Design 
To examine the relation between systemic risk and institutional ownership, we estimate the 
following OLS regression: 
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where SYS_RISK is either MES or Overlap_Low_Days.  We control for bank size, beta, 
opacity, Tier 1 capital, deposits, revenue mix, stock volatility, as well as bank- and year-fixed 
effects. Systemic risk measures are defined in section 2.2.  Size is calculated as the log of total 
assets as of the end of the year and controls for the fact that larger banks will have a higher 
association with systemic risk.  Beta is the correlation between the annual value-weighted market 
return, excluding the firm of interest, and the firm return. Given several prior studies have 
documented IO and comovement in returns, including beta in our empirical specifications 
effectively controls for the correlation in returns across the entire return distribution, allowing us 
to isolate the incremental tail-risk. Opacity is measured as the amount of derivative liabilities 
scaled by total assets at the end of the prior year.  The amount of derivative liabilities is calculated 
as the sum of the gross amount of derivate liabilities from trading activities and that from non-
trading (i.e., hedging) activities. We include this variable to control for previously documented 
relation between IO and opaqueness. Tier1 is the Tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio of the bank at 
the end of the prior year, controlling for bank capital. Deposits, measured as total deposits scaled 
by total liabilities at the end of the prior year, assists us in controlling for differences in funding 
stability. We also control for Revenue Mix, which is measured as interest revenues divided by total 
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revenues at the end of the prior year. Lastly, we control for Stock Volatility computed as the 
standard deviation of the bank’s daily stock returns over the prior year, to control for idiosyncratic 
risk. We also include bank and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the bank-level to 
control for transitory shocks correlated across time for a given bank. All variables are defined in 
further detail in Appendix 1.      
  
4 Empirical Results 
4.1 Institutional Ownership and Systemic Risk   
Table 2 presents the multivariate regression results examining the base relation between 
IO and systemic risk.  There is a negative coefficient on IO when MES is the dependent variable 
(model 1) and a positive coefficient on IO when Overlap_Low_Days is the dependent variable 
(model 2).  Both coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% levels.  Consistent with our 
primary hypothesis, the evidence suggests that higher levels of institutional ownership are 
significantly associated with higher future systemic risk, both in terms of lower average returns on 
the lowest market return days and a higher number of overlapping days with the lowest market 
return days. The results are also economically significant, with a one standard deviation increase 
in institutional ownership is associated with a decrease (increase) in MES (Overlap_Low_Days) of 
19% (13%), relative to sample means.9   
The coefficient estimates for the control variables also indicate that tail risk comovement, 
as represented by our proxies, increases with the size of a firm, and the correlation with the annual 
value-weighted market return, consistent with our understanding and prior literature.  
                                                             
9 We also run a “changes” specification, where we regress year-on-year changes in our systemic risk proxies on ex-
ante chances in IO and find similar results. In particular, we find a negative and significant coefficient on ΔMES of -
0.007 (standard error of 0.003) and positive and significant coefficient on ΔOverlap_Low_Days of 2.978 (standard 
error of 0.578). This provides further corroborating evidence linking IO to systemic risk.    
17 
 
4.2 Institutional Ownership and Systemic Risk in Economic Downturns 
While the prior results present initial evidence that IO is related to future systemic risk, we 
would expect this relation to be stronger during economic downturns if IO is a potential 
transmission mechanism of systemic risk.  During economic downturns, banks are more likely to 
need to raise capital while simultaneously facing illiquid markets (Bushman and Williams, 2015).  
Furthermore, the presence of institutions in the shareholder base of banks likely magnifies the 
illiquidity concerns because during these down markets, institutional investors are likely to face 
shocks in their own portfolio, adverse shocks to their funding liquidity, and their trades are likely 
to be more correlated (e.g. Boyson et al. 2010).  
To test our conjecture, we estimate equation (2) during economic downturns (“recession” 
and “high private debt to GDP” periods) and in all other periods outside the economic downturns 
(“expansion” and “low private debt to GDP periods”).  A bank-year is defined as a “recession” 
year if the majority of the calendar year is comprised of recessionary periods.10  A bank-year is 
defined as a “high private debt to GDP” if the U.S. private debt to GDP is higher than the sample 
median. We use the high private debt to GDP ratio as an additional proxy for economic downturns 
as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has regularly published and monitored country-
level aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP gaps as an early warning indicator (EWI) of banking 
crises in an attempt to detect the build-up of financial booms. The basic intuition is that outsized 
financial booms can generate the conditions for future banking distress and can be represented by 
surges in private debt. 
We present the results in Table 3. Using the recessionary periods designated by the NBER 
as our measure of economic downturns in Panel A, we see that across both the recession and 
                                                             
10 As per the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) business cycle dating.  
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expansion partitions the coefficient on IO is negative for MES,11 while they are positive and 
significant for Overlap_Low_Days. While the coefficients are not statistically different, the 
magnitude of the coefficients are consistent with our arguments. Specifically the economic 
magnitude of the recession coefficient in the Overlap_Low_Days regression suggests that a one 
standard deviation increase in IO leads to an 18% increase in the bank’s overlap when the sector 
is experiencing low returns. In contrast during expansion periods the economic magnitude drops 
to approximately 11%.  
Panel B presents the results for the partitions of bank-years according to national aggregate 
levels of private debt to GDP. We see that across both the low and high partitions the coefficient 
on IO is negative for MES, while they are positive and significant for Overlap_Low_Days. The 
magnitude of the coefficients are consistent with our arguments and statistically different at 1% 
for Overlap_Low_Days. Specifically the economic magnitude of the high private debt to GDP 
coefficient in the Overlap_Low_Days regression suggests that a one standard deviation increase 
in IO leads to a 21% increase in the bank’s overlap when the sector is experiencing low returns. In 
contrast during expansion periods the economic magnitude drops to approximately 8%.  
Overall, the results are consistent with IO acting as a potential channel through which 
systemic risk can propagate through the banking sector, with the relationship appearing to be 
stronger during economic downturns as we would expect.  In the following sections, we set out to 
validate our systemic risk proxies and better understand the underlying mechanisms through which 
IO may act as a transmission mechanism. 
 
                                                             
11 Although larger in magnitude, the coefficient is not significant for the recession subsample possibly due to the 
smaller sample size. 
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4.3 Institutional Ownership, Systemic Risk and Capital Needs 
   The positive relation between IO and our systemic risk proxies can be particularly 
damaging to the banking system during periods in which banks have higher capital and liquidity 
needs. One of the reasons tail-risk comovement is seen as an important dimension of systemic risk 
is because the correlated drops in banking sector prices make it difficult for banks to raise equity 
and keep adequate capital and liquidity ratios during periods when they need it the most. Thus, as 
the previous results suggest IO may exacerbate equity price tail risk, we would expect the 
association between IO and our systemic risk measures to be stronger for banks with higher capital 
needs. To test this prediction, we partition our sample into high and low capital need bank-years, 
using both bank capital ratios and their liquid asset shortfall.  
Table 4, panel A presents the results for the partitions on low and high capital ratios. Low 
Capital Ratio equals one when the Combined Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio for the bank is below 
13%.  High Capital Ratio equals one when the Combined Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio for the bank 
is above 20% (Bushman and Williams, 2012).  
Our motivation is that when banks are closer to capital ratio regulatory thresholds it may 
indicates a need to raise additional capital soon.  Consequently, a lower capital ratio suggests a 
potential position of greater capital needs. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that the 
association between IO and our measures of systemic risk is only significant when banks exhibit 
lower capital ratios.  This aligns with the idea that IO may increase the tail-risk of banks precisely 
when they are most susceptible to this propagation of systemic risk, specifically when they have 
greater capital needs.   
The liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) of Basel III imposes that financial firms hold a sufficient 
amount of high-quality liquid assets to cover their liquidity needs over a month of stressed liquidity 
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scenario. We follow Pierret (2015) and use a measure of liquid asset shortfall to proxy for 
regulators’ liquidity coverage ratio. Our liquid asset shortfall measures the difference between a 
bank’s short-term debt and short-term assets and is used in this paper as a proxy for the exposure 
of a bank to funding liquidity risk. The higher a bank’s liquid asset shortfall, the greater its funding 
risk is. The complete description of the computation of our Liquid Asset Shortfall measure is in 
Appendix 1.  
To investigate whether our results on the association between IO and systemic risk are stronger 
for banks with higher funding risk, which would be particularly concerning for regulators, we 
partition our sample into banks with high and low liquid asset shortfall.  Specifically, we examine 
the bank-years in the top and bottom terciles of our measure of liquid asset shortfall to compare 
the banks that are more and least likely, respectively, to be subject to the propagation of systemic 
risk through IO based on their capital needs. Table 4, panel B presents the results. Consistent with 
the results in panel A, it is only in the subsample of high capital needs bank-years, in this case high 
liquid asset shortfall bank-years, that the coefficient on IO is statistically significant across both  
measures of systemic risk.   
These findings may be of particular interest and relevance to regulators as it suggests that banks 
with higher levels of IO may have difficulties in maintaining their capital adequacy and covering 
their debt with liquid assets. 
4.4 Type of Institutional Ownership 
While our initial results suggest that IO could be a mechanism through which systemic risk 
propagates through the banking sector, we turn our attention towards specific types of institutional 
investors to give more credence to the trading mechanism we suggest in this paper.  Specifically, 
we hypothesize that active institutions, where active is defined as high turnover funds, and 
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transient investors, where transient is defined as in Bushee (2001) as institutions with short 
investment horizons, should have a stronger relation to our systemic risk measures due to the fact 
that these funds trade more, are likely to have more correlated demand within the banking sector, 
and thus are more likely to propagate comovement (e.g. Greenwood and Thesmar [2011]).   
When isolating active funds in Table 5 panel A, we find that the coefficients are still in the 
predicted directions and have similar significances to our original pooled results, but importantly 
the coefficient magnitudes are much larger for active institutions.  For MES, the coefficient on IO 
is more than five times greater in magnitude than the original coefficient in Table 2, while for 
Overlap_Low_Days, the coefficient increases almost four-fold, however it should be noted that 
the average active IO within banks is a relatively small portion of the total IO. These results add 
strength to the argument that institutions are the mechanism through which systemic risk 
propagates through the banking sector and that active institutions in particular contribute to this 
risk through their trading behavior.   
In addition, we also employ the investor classifications of Bushee (2001) and run our main 
specifications for transient, quasi-indexer, and dedicated IO. Table 5, Panel B reports our results. 
Consistent with our results on active IO, we find a negative and significant coefficient on transient 
IO that is almost three times larger than our main results in Table 2 for MES and a significantly 
positive coefficient on transient IO that is more than two times larger than its analog in Table 2 for 
Overlap_Low_Days.  In contrast, we find a positive (negative) but insignificant coefficient on 
dedicated IO for MES (Overlap_Low_Days), possibly suggesting these institutional investors may 
in fact attenuate the propagation of systemic risk, consistent with the greater monitoring role these 
particular type of institutions may play.  
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4.5 Common Institutional Ownership 
 To further examine the trading mechanism we propose, we examine a specific channel 
through which IO may propagate systemic risk, overlap in IO. To this end, we match each bank-
year observation to other banks that share a common institutional owner and banks that do not 
share a common institutional owner. We then repeat our main analysis across the two sets of 
matched bank samples to test whether the overlap in institutional ownership specifically 
contributes to systemic risk.  More specifically, we re-define banking sector to include only those 
banks that share institutional investors, i.e. have overlapping IO.     
Table 6 presents the results. Consistent with our predictions, we find that overlapping IO 
is significantly more likely to propagate systemic risk, relative to non-overlapping IO, providing a 
direct channel through which IO can transmit systemic risk. Specifically, the adverse effect of IO 
on systemic risk is almost five times stronger for MES and four times stronger for 
Overlap_Low_Days for shared ownership.12 However, it is important to note that even in the 
absence of an overlapping IO investor base, we find that IO is still able to exacerbate tail risk 
comovement. This evidence is consistent with theories of investor clienteles (e.g. correlated style 
investing) that predict comovement in market prices without necessarily requiring overlapping 
investor base, as long as investor preferences are correlated within a clientele (e.g. Barberis and 
Shleifer 2003; Sun 2015). For example, several hedge funds pursuing the same investment style, 
e.g. value or momentum, will tend trade in the same set of stocks. Moreover, as these investors’ 
risk aversion, sentiment, or liquidity needs change they alter their exposure to the preferred set of 
stocks which in turn leads to correlated trading patterns (e.g. Sun 2015; Greenwood and Thesmar 
2011). Consistent with these arguments our results suggest that correlated demand and the large 
                                                             
12 These results are broadly consistent with a concurrent working paper by Iselin et al. (2017) who document that 
overlapping block ownership—i.e. equity stakes greater than 5%—exacerbates systemic risk.    
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positions of institutional investors within the banking sector alone is enough to significantly 
increase tail risk co-dependence.   
4.6 Institutional Ownership Dispersion 
Motivated by the recent push from the Basel III requirements to strengthen market 
discipline, we examine whether variation in the monitoring incentives of institutional owners 
matters for the relationship between IO and tail risk comovement.  Specifically, if an institution 
has an incentive to monitor, it could play this market disciplining role.  However, if IO is acting 
through a trading channel as we propose, we would expect institutions that have less of an incentive 
to monitor to drive our initial results as these firms are more likely to simply exit their poor 
performing positions.   
We begin by computing the concentration of IO holdings for the banks in our sample using 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index, normalized to be between zero and one. IO is considered 
dispersed (concentrated) when the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index is below (above) the sample 
median. In examining IO concentration we expect the observed relation between IO and systemic 
tail risk comovement is likely to be driven by those banks with more dispersed IO. We posit this 
for the following reasons: (1) the incentive to monitor is reduced with more dispersed IO due to 
free-rider problems, i.e. each investor relies on others to undertake the costly activity of 
monitoring; and (2) the relative ease of “exit” for any given institution given their larger more 
diversified portfolios.    
Table 7 reports results from our main specification partitions based on the dispersed and 
concentrated IO. For the subset of banks with dispersed IO we find a significantly negative 
coefficient (-0.010) on IO in our MES specification, and a significantly positive coefficient (3.199) 
on IO in our Overlap_Low_Days specification. In contrast, the coefficients on IO for both our 
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systemic risk measures for the subset of banks with more concentrated IO are much smaller in 
magnitude and furthermore, not statistically significant.  Taken together, these results suggest that 
particularly when many institutional owners enter a stock and IO becomes more dispersed this 
reduces the individual incentive to monitor and IO can exacerbate systemic risk.  These results are 
also broadly consistent with our empirical findings in Table 5 where we observe transient IO 
exacerbates tail risk comovement.   
4.7 Institutional Ownership, Systemic Risk and Disclosure 
Given the regulatory approach of Basel III to promote market discipline in part through 
greater disclosures, we next examine the role disclosure plays in the relationship between 
institutional ownership and systemic risk. Prior studies suggest that disclosure plays an important 
role in decreasing information asymmetry, and may also increase liquidity and facilitate better 
monitoring. In the context of banks, Bushman and Williams (2015) find that higher quality 
financial reporting can mitigate systemic concerns. Moreover, as institutions experience adverse 
shocks in their portfolios, greater disclosure may reduce the uncertainty surrounding the 
fundamentals of the bank, reducing the propagation of the adverse shock for more transparent 
banks due to decreased correlation across investors’ trades and trades within an investor’s portfolio 
(e.g. Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009).13 As a result, we predict that disclosure will moderate the 
relation between institutional ownership and systemic risk.  
                                                             
13 Increased transparency reduces the uncertainty of a firm’s true economic value, then this may reduce the propagation 
of systemic risk. For example, transparency will reduce information asymmetry and has the potential to improve 
liquidity by reducing private information concerns between investors; concerns that are more pronounced during 
market downturns, precisely when firms may prefer a lower cost of capital and the lack of liquidity is of most 
consequence. Analytically, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), and Vayanos (2004), shows that when investors are 
hit with liquidity shocks, they will tend to liquidate and sell asset positions that they are most uncertain about (“flight 
to quality”). Therefore, to the extent that greater disclosures reduces the uncertainty of investors, then it has the 
potential to reduce the transmission of systemic risk for banks that are more transparent as institutional investors would 
be less inclined to sell those stocks in response to adverse movement in their portfolios and the need to fulfill potential 
redemptions.   
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To test our above prediction, we partition our sample into banks with high and low levels 
of disclosure using two measures of bank disclosure predicated on the Basel III concept of more 
disclosure of information for market participants to utilize. First, we measure disclosure using 
management forecasts. Forecast equals one if the bank disclosed at least one management forecast 
over the prior year according to I/B/E/S Guidance. Second, we explore a measure of Disclosure 
Quantity, using the number of words in firm’s 10-K scaled by 1000. The idea is that longer filings 
contain a larger number of disclosed items and more information is available to investors. 
Table 8 presents the results.  Across both measures of disclosure, we find there is a 
significantly negative relationship between IO and MES and a significantly positive relationship 
between IO and Overlap_Low_Days for the low disclosure subsamples using both of our measures 
of disclosure.  These results are all statistically significant at the 1% level.  In contrast, for the high 
disclosure banks, there is a statistically insignificant coefficient on IO for MES and a significantly 
positive coefficient on IO for Overlap_Low_Days for both measures of disclosure.  Furthermore, 
the statistically significant coefficients for the high disclosure firms are lower in magnitude than 
those of the low disclosure firms.  Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that 
disclosure may play a role in mitigating the part IO plays in the propagation of systemic risk as the 
relationship between IO and systemic risk is largely isolated within low disclosure banks.   
However, we must acknowledge that disclosure may have a direct effect on IO. For example, 
theoretical and empirical research suggests that institutional investors are attracted to firms with 
better disclosures due to lower monitoring costs (e.g. Healy et al. 1999; Bushee and Noe 2000; 
Lambert et al. 2007; Ferreira and Matos 2008). Given our arguments above that greater 
transparency may reduce systemic risk, one may expect to observe banks with high disclosure to 
have higher levels of IO and lower systemic risk, which may confound our disclosure tests. 
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Notwithstanding, we are comfortable with our inference of a mediating effect of disclosure on the 
propagation of systemic risk by IO for the following reasons: (1) our consistent results that higher 
IO is associated with increases in systemic risk, (2) the measurement of IO and disclosure in t-1 
and the inclusion of bank fixed effects, and (3) the empirical fact that within our sample, banks 
with higher disclosures have only marginally higher IO than those banks with low IO, we are 
comfortable that our disclosure results are identifying    
4.8 Exogenous changes in IO: Russell 1000/2000  
While we argue that IO plays a transmission role in the propagation of systemic risk in 
banks rather than inherently creating it, we note there may be a concern that IO may prefer certain 
bank types, in this case, banks exhibiting higher tail risk comovement.  To empirically address this 
potential endogeneity concern, we adopt an instrumental variables approach.  Specifically, we seek 
an instrument that is related to the level of IO, but uncorrelated with unobservable bank 
characteristics linked to systemic risk. We follow Appel et al. (2016) and use the inclusion of a 
bank in the top of the Russell 2000 index as opposed to the bottom of Russell 1000 index as an 
instrument. The argument is that around the index cutoff, banks should have similar characteristics, 
but the indexing strategies of institutional investors should be different enough to detect IO’s 
propagation of systemic risk. 
We restrict our sample from 2000 to 2006 and conduct our analyses using two bandwidths. 
First, we follow Appel et al. (2016) and compare banks in the top 250 of Russell 2000 index to 
banks at the bottom 250 of Russell 1000 index. As few bank stocks are part of either index, our 
sample is reduced considerably. Thus, we also conduct our tests comparing banks in the top 750 
of Russell 2000 index to banks at the bottom 750 of Russell 1000 index.  
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Table 9 presents the results. Russell 2000 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a bank is 
included in the top of the Russell 2000 index (ranked 1001 to 1250 or 1001 to 1750, depending on 
the bandwidth being used) and 0 if in the bottom of Russell 1000 index (ranked 751 to 1000 or 
251 to 1000, depending on the bandwidth being used) according to market capitalization weights 
calculated from CRSP. We first validate that the extent of IO is higher for banks included in the 
top of Russell 2000 index compared to banks at the bottom of Russell 1000 index, as indicated by 
the positive and significant coefficients for the Russell 2000 in the first stage regressions for both 
bandwidths presented in columns 1 and 4. Columns 2-3 and 5-6 replicate our main results using 
the predicted IO from this instrumental variable approach. Even in these much smaller subsamples, 
predicted IO is significantly associated with higher systemic risk in a consistent manner with our 
previous results. 
4.9 Sensitivity and Robustness Analyses 
We conduct several robustness tests to ensure our inferences remain valid.  First, we re-
perform our main analysis using a MES measure based on the bottom 10% of equity market returns 
instead of 5%.  We find our main results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar and inferences 
remain unchanged. Second, our results are also robust to using equal-weighted market returns are 
opposed to value-weighted market returns for our systemic risk measures, as well as replacing the 
bank market beta with a total market beta. Finally, in addition to clustering by firm we also cluster 
by year and note that our results remain qualitatively similar.   
 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we investigate whether institutional ownership in banking stocks is associated 
with increased tail risk comovement. Specifically, we examine whether IO acts as a transmission 
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mechanism through which shocks in one bank are transmitted to other banks through overlapping 
investors and correlated trades. To examine our research question, we use a large sample of US 
banks from 2001-2013 and collect institutional ownership data for each bank. We then explore the 
relationship between institutional ownership and two different tail risk comovement measures. Our 
results provide robust evidence that banks with higher levels of institutional ownership have higher 
subsequent tail risk comovement. We also show that the result is more pronounced during 
economic downturns which is consistent with the view that during economic downturns the needs 
of banks to raise capital in conjunction with illiquid markets and IO’s trading behavior are likely 
to make tail risk comovement more pronounced. We also find consistent cross-sectional evidence 
that IO increases tail-risk when banks have heightened capital needs and are most vulnerable.   
Consistent with a trading mechanism, we find the results are stronger for active and 
transient IO, as well as for banks that have common ownership.  However, we also find evidence 
that IO propagates systemic risk through non-overlapping ownership as well, consistent with 
investor clientele, style investing, and program trading theories.   
We also find evidence that the adverse effects of IO are stronger for banks with more 
dispersed holdings, suggesting the results are particularly relevant when there are low incentives 
to monitor. Finally we find disclosure may play a role in mitigating the relationship between IO 
and future systemic risk; in particular, we find that the results are primarily isolated and stronger 
in low disclosure banks.   
 Overall our study makes two significant contributions to the literature. First, our paper 
contributes to the systemic risk literature by examining how the investor base of a bank can 
potentially facilitate systemic risk due to the network institutional holdings create that can thereby 
transmit systemic shocks through the banking sector.  Our results suggest a specific mechanism 
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through which the trading activity of institutional owners can in certain cases exacerbate systemic 
risk.  In addition, we contribute to the literature examining the relation between disclosure and 
institutional owners.  In contrast to the prior literature that suggests greater institutional ownership 
is a beneficial characteristic for firms, we posit and investigate a potential cost of increased 
institutional ownership by documenting that tail risk comovement is increasing in institutional 
ownership.  
Our results also speak tangentially to the debate on the role of private monitoring in banks. 
The results suggest that while institutional investors may be able to act as a governance mechanism 
and promote private monitoring this needs to be weighed against the possibility that institutional 
ownership acts as a transmission mechanism for industry shocks. Since the financial crisis there 
has been a great deal of interest in understanding the nature of systemic risk in the financial sector 
and attempting to mitigate it through bank regulation and market discipline. Our paper offers 
evidence that while institutional owners can play a monitoring role in a bank and reduce risk-
taking incentives, these same institutions can actually become a catalyst for the very risk regulators 
hoped these investors would mitigate.   
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Appendix 1 – Variable Descriptions 
 
Systemic risk variables 
MESi,t = Marginal expected shortfall at the 5% level, defined as the average 
firm return on the lowest market return days as classified by the 
bottom  5% of annual value-weighted market return days during the 
current year 
Overlap_Low_Daysi,t = Number of days that overlap between the twenty lowest firm return 
days and the twenty lowest annual value-weighted market return days 
during the current year 
  
Institutional ownership variables 
IOi,t-1 = Institutional ownership holdings at the end of the prior year, defined 
as total shares held by institutions divided by the total shares 
outstanding 
Active_IOi,t-1 = “Active” institutional holdings at the end of the prior year.  We 
define active institutional owners based on portfolio turnover 
classifications provided by FactSet, where institutions classified as 
having “Very High” and “High” portfolio turnover are active    
Transient_IOi,t-1 = “Transient” institutional holdings at the end of the prior year. We 
define transient institutional owners based on classifications provided 
on Brian Bushee’s website 
Quasi-indexer_IOi,t-1 = “Quasi-indexer” institutional holdings at the end of the prior year. 
We define quasi-indexer institutional owners based on classifications 
provided on Brian Bushee’s website 
Dedicated_IOi,t-1 = “Dedicated” institutional holdings at the end of the prior year. We 
define dedicated institutional owners based on classifications 
provided on Brian Bushee’s website 
IO_Concentration i,t-1 = Concentration of institutional holdings using the Hirschman-
Herfindahl Index, normalized to be between zero and one. 
Institutional ownership is considered dispersed (concentrated) when 
the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index is below (above) the sample median. 
Russell 2000 i,t-1 = Indicator variable equal to 1 if a bank is included in the top of the 
Russell 2000 index and 0 if in the bottom of Russell 1000 index 
according to market capitalization values calculated from CRSP. 
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Disclosure and control variables 
Forecast i,t-1 = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank disclosed at least one 
management forecast over the prior year according to I/B/E/S 
Guidance, and 0 otherwise 
Disclosure Quantity i,t-1 = Number of words in firm’s 10-K scaled by 1000 
Size i,t-1 = Log of total assets at the end of the prior year 
Beta i,t-1 = Correlation between annual value-weighted market return and firm 
return over the prior year 
Opacity i,t-1 = Amount of derivative liabilities scaled by total assets at the end of 
the prior year. The amount of derivatives liabilities is calculated as 
the sum of the gross amount of derivative liabilities from trading 
activities and that from non-trading (i.e., hedging) activities. The 
gross amount of derivative liabilities from non-trading activities is the 
sum of items bhck8745, bhck8746, bhck8747, and bhck8748 from FR 
Y-9C filings. The gross amount of derivative liabilities from trading 
activities is the sum of items bhckc220, bhckc222, bhck8737, 
bhck8738, bhck8739, and bhck8740 
Tier1 i,t-1 = Tier 1 risk-adjusted capital ratio at the end of the prior year 
Deposits i,t-1 = Total deposits over total liabilities at the end of the prior year 
Revenue Mix i,t-1 = Interest revenues over total revenues at the end of the prior year 
Stock Volatility i,t-1 = Standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock returns over the prior 
year 
Recession t = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the year is 2001, 2008 or 2009 
Private Debt to GDP t = U.S. Private sector debt to GDP. This ratio measures the 
indebtedness of non-financial corporations, households and non-
profit institutions serving households, as a percentage of GDP 
Capital Ratio i,t = Combined risk-adjusted capital ratio for the bank at the end of the 
year 
Liquid Asset Shortfall i,t = Short-term debt minus short-term assets for the bank at the end of 
the year. Short-term debt is defined as Federal funds purchased + 
Repurchase agreements + Brokered deposits (< $100K, maturity ≤ 1 
Year) + Time deposits (≥ $100K, maturity ≤ 1Year) + Foreign office 
time deposits (maturity ≤ 1Year) + Commercial paper. Short-term 
assets are defined as Cash & non-interest-bearing deposits + Total 
interest-bearing balances + Federal funds sold + Reverse repurchases 
agreements + Debt securities maturing or repriced (maturity ≤ 1Year) 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports sample descriptive statistics for our sample of banks with two-digit SIC codes 
beginning with 60 and 61 from 2001-2013.  Variables are as defined in Appendix 1.   
Variables Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 N 
MES -0.0115 0.0160 -0.0192 -0.0083 -0.0012 6,493 
Overlap_Low_Days 5.1314 3.7934 2.0000 4.0000 8.0000 6,493 
       
IO 0.2644 0.2372 0.0733 0.1912 0.4131 6,493 
Active_IO 0.0050 0.0099 0.0000 0.0001 0.0057 6,493 
Transient_IO 0.0512 0.0691 0.0001 0.0196 0.0833 5,594 
Quasi-indexer_IO 0.1773 0.1842 0.0170 0.1146 0.2892 5,594 
Dedicated_IO 0.0251 0.0414 0.0000 0.0009 0.0372 5,594 
IO_Concentration 0.2257 0.2199 0.0694 0.1464 0.3049 6,493 
       
Forecast 0.1092 0.3118 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6,493 
Disclosure Quantity 3.8199 2.4064 2.5901 3.3693 4.47845 5,104 
       
Size 7.3175 1.4981 6.2830 7.0179 8.0300 6,493 
Beta 0.2884 0.2895 0.0485 0.1745 0.5531 6,493 
Opacity 0.0010 0.0052 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6,493 
Tier1 11.7361 3.5068 9.4100 11.2000 13.4000 6,493 
Deposits 0.8288 0.1091 0.7675 0.8491 0.9100 6,493 
Revenue Mix 0.8379 0.2965 0.7941 0.8606 0.9134 6,493 
Stock Volatility 0.0250 0.0128 0.0161 0.0211 0.0299 6,493 
Private Debt to GDP 199.0378 9.5627 188.5000 198.3000 204.7000 6,493 
Capital Ratio 14.6101 4.5624 11.8900 13.5000 15.8000 5,558 
Liquid Asset Shortfall 7,283.33 46,808.08 344.36 731.22 2,086.31 6,167 
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Table 2: Systemic Risk and Institutional Ownership 
This table reports OLS regressions of our systemic risk measures on institutional ownership.  All variables are 
as defined in Appendix 1.  Institutional ownership and controls are lagged by one year.  Bank and year fixed 
effects are included and standard errors are clustered by bank.  Standard errors are reported below coefficient 
estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.     
 
  Systemic Risk Proxy 
  MES Overlap_Low_Days 
Variable Prediction (1) (2) 
IO -/+ -0.009*** 2.803*** 
  (0.002) (0.423) 
Size  -0.003*** 0.478*** 
  (0.001) (0.157) 
Beta  -0.016*** 4.524*** 
  (0.001) (0.263) 
Opacity  -0.111 1.475 
  (0.079) (18.482) 
Tier1  -0.000 0.048*** 
  (0.000) (0.015) 
Deposits  -0.005 -0.176 
  (0.004) (0.585) 
Revenue Mix  0.000 -0.040 
  (0.000) (0.028) 
Stock Volatility  -0.161*** -15.876*** 
  (0.030) (4.407) 
    
Fixed Effects  Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations  6,493 6,493 
R-squared  0.608 0.780 
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Table 3: Systemic Risk and Institutional Ownership in Economic Downturns 
This table reports OLS regressions of our systemic risk measures on institutional ownership, partitioning the 
sample on expansion and recession periods and on Low Private Debt to GDP periods and High Private Debt 
to GDP periods. Panel A presents the results partitioning the sample into expansion and recession years. 
Recession years are 2001, 2008 and 2009. Panel B presents the results partitioning the sample into high and 
low private debt to GDP years. High Private Debt to GDP equals one when the U.S. Private Debt to GDP is 
above the sample median.  Low Private Debt to GDP equals one when the U.S. Private Debt to GDP is 
below the sample median. Private debt to GDP is measured at the same year as MES and 
Overlap_Low_Days. High Private Debt to GDP years are 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011. All 
variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  Institutional ownership and controls are lagged by one year.  Bank 
and year fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered by bank.  Standard errors are reported 
below coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
  Panel A: Partitions on Expansion and Recession Periods 
    Systemic Risk Proxy: MES   Systemic Risk Proxy: Overlap_Low_Days 
    Expansion Recession   Expansion Recession 
Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
IO -0.008*** -0.012  2.365*** 3.891*** 
  (0.002) (0.009)  (0.475) (1.266) 
Size -0.002** -0.007***  0.507*** 0.829* 
 (0.001) (0.002)  (0.188) (0.456) 
Beta -0.018*** -0.006  5.012*** 4.314*** 
 (0.002) (0.005)  (0.325) (0.719) 
Opacity -0.046 -0.131  14.510 -61.254** 
 (0.053) (0.410)  (21.236) (30.753) 
Tier1 -0.000 -0.000  0.054*** 0.007 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.017) (0.050) 
Deposits -0.008* -0.003  -0.065 0.622 
 (0.004) (0.012)  (0.703) (1.887) 
Revenue Mix -0.005 0.000  -0.318 -0.095** 
 (0.005) (0.000)  (0.777) (0.043) 
Stock Volatility -0.144*** -0.015  -12.194** -45.237*** 
 (0.032) (0.094)  (5.825) (12.536) 
      
Fixed Effects Bank, Year Bank, Year  Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations 4,930 1,563  4,930 1,563 
R-squared 0.651 0.763  0.782 0.887 
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Table 3: Systemic Risk and Institutional Ownership in in Economic Downturns (continued) 
Panel B: Partitions on Private Debt to GDP     
  Systemic Risk Proxy: MES   
Systemic Risk Proxy: 
Overlap_Low_Days 
  
Low Private Debt 
to GDP 
High Private 
Debt to GDP   
Low Private 
Debt to GDP 
High Private 
Debt to GDP 
Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
IO -0.008*** -0.014***   1.726*** 4.522*** 
  (0.002) (0.004)   (0.619) (0.835) 
Size -0.002** -0.005***   0.686*** 0.714** 
  (0.001) (0.002)   (0.226) (0.329) 
Beta -0.004*** -0.016***   4.185*** 2.377*** 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.418) (0.493) 
Opacity 0.119 -0.375**   -23.641 27.212 
  (0.122) (0.154)   (35.517) (21.593) 
Tier 1 -0.000 -0.000   0.040* 0.073*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.024) (0.025) 
Deposits 0.003 -0.012*   -1.473* 2.034* 
  (0.004) (0.007)   (0.872) (1.062) 
Revenue Mix -0.001 0.000*   -0.073 -0.045* 
  (0.005) (0.000)   (0.912) (0.026) 
Stock Volatility -0.133*** -0.134***   1.587 -35.122*** 
  (0.032) (0.051)   (7.108) (6.722) 
            
Fixed Effects Bank, Year Bank, Year   Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations 3,080 3,415   3,080 3,415 
R-squared 0.679 0.631   0.804 0.814 
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Table 4: Systemic Risk and Institutional Ownership for Banks with High and Low Capital Needs 
This table reports OLS regressions of our systemic risk measures on institutional ownership, partitioning the sample on banks’ capital needs. Panel A 
presents the results partitioning the sample on banks’ capital ratios. Low Capital Ratio equals one when the Combined Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio 
for the bank is below 13%.  High Capital Ratio equals one when the Combined Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio for the bank is above 20%. Capital Ratios 
are measured at the same year as MES and Overlap_Low_Days. Panel B presents the results partitioning the sample on banks’ Liquid Asset Shortfall. 
Low Liquid Asset Shortfall equals one when Liquid Asset Shortfall is in the bottom tercile.  High Liquid Asset Shortfall equals one when Liquid Asset 
Shortfall is in the top tercile. Liquid Asset Shortfall is measured at the same year as MES and Overlap_Low_Days. All other variables are as defined 
in Appendix 1.  Institutional ownership and controls are lagged by one year.  Bank and year fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered 
by bank.  Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.   
Panel A: Partitions on Capital Ratios   
  MES   Overlap_Low_Days 
  
Low Capital Needs 
(High Capital Ratio) 
High Capital Needs 
(Low Capital Ratio)   
Low Capital Needs 
(High Capital Ratio) 
High Capital Needs 
(Low Capital Ratio) 
Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
IO -0.005 -0.012***   2.199 3.858*** 
  (0.006) (0.004)   (1.791) (0.805) 
Size -0.001 -0.003*   0.553 0.367 
  (0.003) (0.002)   (1.386) (0.309) 
Beta -0.001 -0.017***   0.712 4.628*** 
  (0.005) (0.003)   (1.525) (0.485) 
Opacity 0.240 -0.098   155.306* 45.027 
  (0.545) (0.132)   (82.523) (30.790) 
Deposits 0.013 -0.002   -2.013 2.024* 
  (0.015) (0.008)   (3.126) (1.194) 
Revenue Mix -0.001 -0.006   -0.084 -0.176 
  (0.018) (0.010)   (3.331) (1.326) 
Stock Volatility 0.091 -0.181***   -11.425 -16.026* 
  (0.102) (0.065)   (24.933) (9.471) 
            
Fixed Effects Bank, Year Bank, Year   Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations 456 2,330   456 2,330 
R-squared 0.810 0.662   0.847 0.814 
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Table 4: Systemic Risk and Institutional Ownership for Banks with High and Low Capital Needs (continued) 
Panel B: Partitions on Liquid Asset Shortfall  
  MES   Overlap_Low_Days 
  
Low Capital Needs 
(Low Liquid Asset 
Shortfall) 
High Capital Needs 
(High Liquid Asset 
Shortfall) 
  
Low Capital Needs 
(Low Liquid Asset 
Shortfall) 
High Capital Needs 
(High Liquid Asset 
Shortfall) 
Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
IO -0.005 -0.007**   0.909 1.588*** 
  (0.005) (0.003)   (1.135) (0.586) 
Size -0.001 -0.002*   0.055 0.233 
  (0.002) (0.001)   (0.261) (0.250) 
Beta -0.001 -0.016***   0.259 5.846*** 
  (0.004) (0.003)   (0.681) (0.555) 
Opacity 0.811 -0.111   -134.205** 3.521 
  (0.527) (0.094)   (65.952) (19.894) 
Tier 1 0.000 -0.000   0.037* 0.070** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.020) (0.033) 
Revenue Mix 0.000 -0.013**   -0.022 -0.453 
  (0.005) (0.007)   (0.704) (1.519) 
Stock Volatility -0.003 -0.339***   -0.365 -52.344*** 
  (0.053) (0.074)   (6.372) (10.771) 
            
Fixed Effects Bank, Year Bank, Year   Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations 2,056 2,055   2,056 2,055 
R-squared 0.328 0.723   0.517 0.728 
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Table 5: Systemic Risk and the Type of Institutional Ownership 
This table reports OLS regressions of our systemic risk measures on the type of institutional 
ownership. Panel A presents the results for the active institutional ownership, ACTIVE_IO.  
ACTIVE_IO represents the institutional ownership in the firm by active institutions based on fund 
turnover.  Panel B presents the results for on transient, quasi-indexer and dedicated institutional 
ownership based on Bushee’s (2001) classifications. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  
Institutional ownership and controls are lagged by one year.  Bank and year fixed effects are included 
and standard errors are clustered by bank.  Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
Panel A: Active IO 
  Systemic Risk Proxy 
  MES Overlap_Low_Days 
Variable Prediction (1) (2) 
Active_IO -/+ -0.047** 10.787*** 
  (0.020) (4.051) 
Size  -0.004*** 0.700*** 
  (0.001) (0.150) 
Beta  -0.017*** 5.027*** 
  (0.001) (0.243) 
Opacity  -0.121 5.359 
  (0.081) (17.630) 
Tier1  -0.000** 0.072*** 
  (0.000) (0.015) 
Deposits  -0.005 -0.073 
  (0.004) (0.591) 
Revenue Mix  0.000* -0.056** 
  (0.000) (0.028) 
Stock Volatility  -0.145*** -20.948*** 
  (0.029) (4.418) 
    
Fixed Effects  Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations  6,493 6,493 
R-squared  0.607 0.778 
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Table 5: Systemic Risk and the Type of Institutional Ownership (continued) 
Panel B:  Transient, Quasi-Indexer and Dedicated IO 
  Systemic Risk Proxy: MES  Systemic Risk Proxy: Overlap_Low_Days 
Variable Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Transient_IO - -0.026***   -0.017***  6.328***   4.537*** 
  (0.005)   (0.005)  (0.967)   (1.031) 
Quasi-indexer_IO -  -0.016***  -0.012***   3.350***  2.299*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.605)  (0.656) 
Dedicated_IO +   0.004 0.011    -1.432 -3.010** 
    (0.007) (0.007)    (1.385) (1.402) 
Size  -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004***  0.786*** 0.663*** 0.869*** 0.713*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.164) (0.166) (0.168) (0.165) 
Beta  -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.017*** -0.015***  4.873*** 4.823*** 5.135*** 4.677*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.264) (0.272) (0.260) (0.274) 
Opacity  -0.154 -0.164 -0.184* -0.141  4.574 7.644 11.603 1.453 
  (0.102) (0.106) (0.110) (0.103)  (18.172) (18.351) (16.695) (19.514) 
Tier1  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** -0.000  0.067*** 0.068*** 0.085*** 0.064*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Deposits  -0.006* -0.007* -0.007* -0.007*  0.411 0.577 0.488 0.521 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  (0.654) (0.655) (0.661) (0.655) 
Revenue Mix  0.000* 0.000* 0.000** 0.000*  -0.044* -0.051* -0.057** -0.049* 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) 
Stock Volatility  -0.130*** -0.131*** -0.120*** -0.135***  -25.318*** -25.444*** -27.775*** -24.191*** 
  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)  (5.070) (5.147) (5.134) (5.098) 
           
Fixed Effects  Bank, Year Bank, Year Bank, Year Bank, Year  Bank, Year Bank, Year Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations  5,594 5,594 5,594 5,594  5,594 5,594 5,594 5,594 
R-squared  0.639 0.639 0.635 0.640  0.789 0.789 0.787 0.791 
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Table 6: Common Overlap in Institutional Ownership 
This table reports OLS regressions of our systemic risk measures on institutional ownership, IO, and 
control variables.  We match each bank-year to (1) banks that share common institutional ownership 
(Common Overlap) and (2) banks that do not share common institutional ownership.  We then repeat our 
analysis from Table 2 across the two sets of matched banks to examine whether common overlap in IO 
contributes to systemic risk. Panel A presents results for MES as our dependent variable, while Panel B 
presents results for Overlap_Low_Days dependent variable. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1. 
Institutional ownership and controls are lagged by one year.  Bank and year fixed effects are included and 
standard errors are clustered by bank.  Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, 
* indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: MES 
  Systemic Risk Proxy: MES 
    Common Overlap Non-common 
Variable Prediction (1) (2) 
IO - -0.028*** -0.006*** 
  (0.008) (0.002) 
Size   0.234*** 0.328*** 
  (0.023) (0.013) 
Beta  -0.003*** -0.001*** 
  (0.001) (0.000) 
Opacity  -0.199** -0.126*** 
  (0.081) (0.051) 
Tier1  -0.001** -0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Deposits  -0.002 -0.003* 
  (0.003) (0.002) 
Revenue Mix  -0.000 -0.002 
  (0.000) (0.002) 
Stock Volatility  -0.162*** -0.224*** 
  (0.014) (0.019) 
    
Fixed Effects  Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations  6,490 6,490 
R-squared  0.725 0.703 
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Table 6: Common Overlap in Institutional Ownership (continued) 
Panel B: Overlap_Low_Days 
  Systemic Risk Proxy: Overlap_Low_Days 
  Common Overlap Non-common 
Variable Prediction (1) (2) 
IO + 6.923*** 1.743*** 
  (2.132) (0.428) 
Size  0.805*** 0.691*** 
  (0.108) (0.131) 
Beta  5.126*** 5.959*** 
  (0.294) (0.314) 
Opacity  10.672 14.619 
  (7.994) (12.463) 
Tier1  0.089*** 0.100*** 
  (0.011) (0.069) 
Deposits  -0.153 -0.237 
  (0.201) (0.591) 
Revenue Mix  -0.076* -0.094 
  (0.039) (0.081) 
Stock Volatility  -19.526*** -24.042*** 
  (6.165) (5.386) 
    
Fixed Effects  Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations  6,490 6,490 
R-squared                                0.792                0.749  
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Table 7: Systemic Risk and Institutional Ownership Dispersion 
 
This table reports OLS regressions of our systemic risk measures on institutional ownership, partitioning the sample on the median of 
IO_Concentration. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  Institutional ownership and controls are lagged by one year.  Bank and year fixed effects 
are included and standard errors are clustered by bank.  Standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.   
    Systemic Risk Proxy: MES   Systemic Risk Proxy: Overlap_Low_Days 
    Concentrated Ownership 
Dispersed 
Ownership   
Concentrated 
Ownership 
Dispersed 
Ownership 
Variable Prediction (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
IO -/- / +/+ -0.002 -0.010***  0.957 3.199*** 
    (0.004) (0.003)  (0.768) (0.546) 
Size  -0.003** -0.002  0.339 0.297 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.251) (0.241) 
Beta  -0.005* -0.014***  1.894*** 5.081*** 
  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.539) (0.408) 
Opacity  -0.415* -0.060  94.491*** -5.046 
  (0.217) (0.090)  (31.296) (22.397) 
Tier1  -0.000 0.000  0.050** 0.036 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.019) (0.025) 
Deposits  -0.004 -0.005  -0.364 -0.566 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.803) (1.078) 
Revenue Mix  0.001*** -0.010*  -0.146*** -0.324 
  (0.000) (0.006)  (0.026) (1.144) 
Stock Volatility  -0.013 -0.302***  -0.900 -39.632*** 
  (0.041) (0.052)  (5.433) (9.589) 
       
Fixed Effects  Bank, Year Bank, Year  Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations  3,053 3,054  3,053 3,054 
R-squared   0.381 0.701  0.525 0.760 
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Table 8: Systemic Risk, Institutional Ownership and Disclosure 
This table reports OLS regressions of our systemic risk measures on institutional ownership partitioning on bank’s level of disclosure. 
Forecast equals to one when the bank disclosed at least one management forecast over the year. Disclosure Quantity is high when the length 
of 10-K disclosures is above the sample median. All variables are as defined in Appendix 1.  Institutional ownership and controls are lagged 
by one year.  Bank and year fixed effects are included and standard errors are clustered by bank.  Standard errors are reported below 
coefficient estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.   
Panel A: Partitions on Management Forecasts 
  MES   Overlap_Low_Days 
  Low Disclosure High Disclosure   Low Disclosure High Disclosure 
  (No Forecast) (Forecast)   (No Forecast) (Forecast) 
Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
IO -0.007*** -0.008   3.053*** 2.435* 
  (0.002) (0.006)   (0.469) (1.464) 
Size -0.003*** -0.000   0.354** 1.198** 
  (0.001) (0.002)   (0.178) (0.536) 
Beta -0.016*** -0.008   4.324*** 5.453*** 
  (0.001) (0.006)   (0.281) (1.151) 
Opacity -0.221* -0.001   23.012 -43.279 
  (0.131) (0.172)   (18.038) (41.468) 
Tier 1 -0.000 -0.000   0.040** 0.110 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.016) (0.082) 
Deposits -0.006 0.015   -0.303 0.556 
  (0.004) (0.012)   (0.616) (2.631) 
Revenue Mix 0.000*** -0.022*   -0.023 -2.897 
  (0.000) (0.012)   (0.024) (2.930) 
Stock Volatility -0.135*** -0.293*   -15.713*** -31.374 
  (0.031) (0.157)   (4.622) (30.183) 
            
Fixed Effects Bank, Year Bank, Year   Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations 5,786 709   5,786 709 
R-squared 0.593 0.827   0.768 0.828 
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Table 8: Systemic Risk, Institutional Ownership and Disclosure (continued) 
Panel B: Partitions on Disclosure Quantity 
  MES   Overlap_Low_Days 
  Low Disclosure High Disclosure   Low Disclosure High Disclosure 
  (Below Median Disclosure Quantity) 
(Above Median 
Disclosure Quantity)   
(Below Median 
Disclosure Quantity) 
(Above Median 
Disclosure Quantity) 
Variable (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
IO -0.018*** -0.002   3.723*** 1.628** 
  (0.005) (0.004)   (0.968) (0.714) 
Size -0.005*** -0.005***   0.489 1.120*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)   (0.308) (0.322) 
Beta -0.011*** -0.014***   3.794*** 2.688*** 
  (0.002) (0.003)   (0.492) (0.579) 
Opacity -0.238 -0.108   -18.570 17.613 
  (0.251) (0.112)   (43.872) (20.758) 
Tier 1 0.000 -0.000   0.051 0.094*** 
  (0.000) (0.000)   (0.031) (0.031) 
Deposits -0.011 0.006   0.315 -0.036 
  (0.007) (0.007)   (1.079) (1.243) 
Revenue Mix 0.000*** -0.003   -0.047** -1.389** 
  (0.000) (0.005)   (0.020) (0.542) 
Stock Volatility -0.119* -0.125**   -5.636 -25.555*** 
  (0.064) (0.050)   (8.937) (8.156) 
            
Fixed Effects Bank, Year Bank, Year   Bank, Year Bank, Year 
Observations 2,552 2,552   2,552 2,552 
R-squared 0.600 0.708   0.735 0.814 
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 Table 9: Instrumental Variable Regressions  
This table reports OLS regressions of our systemic risk measures on institutional ownership using an instrumental variable approach. Russell 2000 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a bank is included in the top of the Russell 2000 index (ranked 1001 to 1250 or 1001 to 1750, depending on the 
bandwidth being used) and 0 if in the bottom of Russell 1000 index (ranked 751 to 1000 or 251 to 1000, depending on the bandwidth being used) 
according to market capitalization weights calculated from CRSP. The sample period is from 2000 to 2006. All variables are as defined in Appendix 
1. Institutional ownership and controls are lagged by one year. Standard errors are clustered by bank.  Standard errors are reported below coefficient 
estimates. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively.   
    Bandwidth: 250  Bandwidth: 750  
    IO MES Overlap_Low_Days  IO MES Overlap_Low_Days  
Variable Prediction (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)   
Russell 2000 + 0.080**    0.095**    
    (0.036)    (0.037)    !"# -/+/-/+  -0.084** 10.446*   -0.079** 7.394*  
   (0.040) (6.263)   (0.031) (4.177)  
Size  -0.106 -0.010 1.250  -0.101** -0.008 0.963  
  (0.069) (0.008) (1.173)  (0.050) (0.005) (0.663)  
Beta  0.230** 0.026** 1.878  0.145* 0.011 3.994***  
  (0.105) (0.012) (1.984)  (0.082) (0.008) (1.073)  
Opacity  7.169 0.470 -134.323  0.214 -0.052 17.050  
  (11.383) (0.985) (142.669)  (4.371) (0.372) (59.063)  
Tier 1  -0.011 -0.001 -0.032  -0.010 -0.001 0.048  
  (0.009) (0.001) (0.135)  (0.007) (0.001) (0.073)  
Deposits  0.046 0.006 1.141  -0.106 -0.009 2.730  
  (0.212) (0.016) (2.231)  (0.205) (0.015) (1.665)  
Revenue Mix  -0.402 -0.034 4.170  -0.274 -0.036** 4.427***  
  (0.250) (0.027) (3.835)  (0.166) (0.016) (1.699)  
Stock Volatility  5.582** 0.194 -8.650  0.008 -0.114 18.356  
  (2.227) (0.273) (41.175)  (2.334) (0.159) (20.740)  
Log Market Value  0.233*** 0.011 -0.327  0.147*** 0.006 0.496  
  (0.051) (0.009) (1.518)  (0.045) (0.005) (0.644)  
          
Observations  215 215 215  676 676 676  
R-squared   0.237    0.119    
 
